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1. In re Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922). In this case, Justice Holmes
stated the following:
In deciding this question we must realize that however ancient may be the
traditions of maritime law, however diverse the sources from which it has been
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accepted and adopted by the United States. There is no mystic over-law to which
even the United States must bow. When a case is said to be governed by foreign
law or by general maritime law that is only a short way of saying that for this
purpose the sovereign power takes up a rule suggested from without and makes
it part of its own rules.
Id.
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Introduction
One cannot look lightly on the jurisdictional parameters of the courts. The
Constitution grants the judiciary a specific set of enumerated cases and
controversies over which it shall have cognizance.2 Outside of this set, the
judiciary is at sea; it poses a threat to the separation of powers and risks
becoming a dangerous and domineering branch. The constitutional sepa-
ration of jurisdictional powers affects all branches of government. Under
the separation of powers doctrine, the judiciary must guard its role and
restrain itself from taking action outside its specified cognizance, just as
the executive and legislative branches are prohibited from expanding the
role of the courts, absent a constitutional amendment.
3
Jurisdictional limitations serve a particularly important function
when the judiciary is dealing with issues of international law. Since much
of international law concerns foreign relations, the province of the execu-
tive and, in part, the legislature, the danger that the judiciary will act in a
policy-making role or will frustrate the functions of the political branches
is especially great. The Framers of the Constitution were particularly con-
cerned with constructing a document in which the government would
2. In this Note, "cognizance" means the power of a court to hear a case or to recog-
nize a doctrine as within its jurisdiction. See William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Pro-
tective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L.
REv. 467, 479 (1986) (stating "Eighteenth century lawyers understood [cognizance] as
referring to a court's power to try a case."). Casto also states that, "lawyers in America
also used 'cognizance' as a synonym for 'jurisdiction,'" at least at the Founding. Id. at
479, n.61 (citing Wilson, Lectures on Law, in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 457 (R.
McCloskey ed., 1967); THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 550-51 (Alexander Hamilton) 0acob E.
Cooke ed., 1961)).
3. See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that
even if Congress intended for the plaintiffs to have standing, it is the province of the
judiciary to define "case" or "controversy" under Article III and Congress lacks the
power to grant jurisdiction where the courts have determined no "case" or "controversy"
exists); THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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speak with one voice in its international dealings.4 Because the judiciary is
insulated from political control, court decisions defining international law
would not only be improper, but would also frustrate the intent of creating
a unitary voice in foreign relations.5
These questions of proper jurisdictional limits in relation to interna-
tional law are implicated in the interpretation of the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA).6 The ATCA states that the district courts will have jurisdiction to
hear those cases in which an alien sues in a civil action for a tort commit-
ted in violation of the law of nations or in violation of a treaty of the United
States.7 Thus, jurisdictional questions arise when applying this statute,
particularly with reference to the meaning of the "law of nations" and the
consequent limits on the judiciary's cognizance over that "law."
Jurisdictional limits are vital to the preservation of a government with
limited authority, and respect for such limits by all branches of government
is necessary for the preservation of individual liberty.8 Jurisdiction consti-
tutes a fundamental check upon the growth of governmental power vis-A-
vis individuals. Jurisdictional statutes should thus be interpreted narrowly
so as to serve the ends of liberty by constraining the means for power.
This Note examines the ATCA and suggests that the application of its
jurisdictional grant has been unconstitutionally expanded by the courts
and currently places a responsibility and power with the judiciary that is
both inconsistent with constitutional structure and dangerously unwise.
Part I provides a brief history of the evolution of the "law of nations" as a
controlling category of law in American courts. Next it discusses the ATCA
and the precedents flowing from its application. Part I also examines the
recent Second Circuit decision of Kadic v. Karadzic, along with its prede-
cessors and progeny. Part II analyzes the constitutional structure and its
relevance to defining the proper scope of the "law of nations" in American
courts. After examining the constitutional history and relevant roles for
the separate branches of government, Part II argues that the ATCA has been
4. See infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of the importance of a unitary executive in order for the govern-
ment to function properly and effectively, see TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXEcunVE:
ThE CASE FOR THE STRONG PRESIDENCY (1992); THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 471-80 (Alexan-
der Hamilton) Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1997).
7. Id.
8. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. Rev.
1387 (1987) (discussing jurisdictional limits on Congressional power). Epstein states:
Provisions that go to the question of jurisdiction are no less important to sound
governance than those that govern individual rights.... Hamilton treated juris-
diction as a more effective guarantor of individual rights than a bill of rights,
because he believed that it provided clear and powerful lines to keep government
from straying beyond its appointed limits.... [Hamilton's judgment] contained
a fair measure of good sense in using jurisdictional limitations as an important,
indeed indispensable, limitation upon government power.
Id. at 1390-91 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton)). James Madison put
it simply when he stated, "Every word of [the Constitution] decides a question between
power and liberty." THE COMPLETE MADIsoN: His BASIc WIuTINGS 335 (Saul K. Padover
ed., 1953) (from an essay published in The National Gazette, January 19, 1792).
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applied in a manner inconsistent with this separation and the Constitu-
tion's formal requirements.
Part III presents a framework through which the ATCA can be applied
in a manner consistent with the structural requirements of the Constitu-
tion. Because Article III enumerates specific categories in which the Fram-
ers understood that the "law of nations" would be implicated, this
enumeration indicates that no general jurisdictional authority over the law
of nations was intended to fall within judicial power. In other words, the
courts may not look to international law as an independent portion of the
"laws of the United States" clause. When the judiciary's jurisdiction is
predicated on that clause, Part III further contends that the judiciary may
only look to those laws passed by Congress pursuant to its power to define
offenses against the law of nations. Because Congress has the power to
define these offenses, this Part concludes that the Constitution does not
contemplate that, as a general matter, international legal principles have
legally controlling authority. In other words, it would be unnecessary for
Congress to define the law of nations if it were a knowable and indepen-
dently controlling doctrine. This framework necessarily limits the judici-
ary's role over the "law of nations" and significantly decreases the scope of
the ATCA's application. The Conclusion indicates that this jurisdictional
limitation, formed from the structure of the Constitution, is the only
method which can be judicially employed without acting ultra vires. The
only legitimate role for the ATCA is in providing jurisdiction for torts in
violation of those "international laws" properly recognized under congres-
sional authority as ordinary laws of the United States or when it acts as a
statutory grant of jurisdiction for cases arising under a jurisdictional cate-
gory of Article III which specifically contemplates the usage of the "law of
nations" in its exercise. Customary international law alone will not
suffice.
I. Current Judicial Standards for Defining the "Law of Nations"
The phrase "law of nations" was the original means for expressing early
international law. In most contemporary literature, the "law of nations" is
considered coterminous with "international law."9 This "law" is unique
because it purports to create universal obligations for all sovereign nation-
states and to police somehow the conduct of those nations. This "law" is
also unique because many commentators feel that it evolves and even
imposes obligations on non-state actors.10 One of the means used to
enforce adherence to this international law is the Alien Tort Claims Act.
9. See, e.g., J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAWV 7-14 (9th ed. 1995).
10. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A
Response to the 'Originalists,' 19 HASMNGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 221, 241-43 (1996)
(arguing that international law is an evolving body that should be applied as that law
exists at the time of suit); Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing:
International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FoRDHA-M L. REv. 463 (1997)
(contending that evolving customary international law belongs in the courts).
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A. The Development of Rules for Ascertaining the "Law of Nations"
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
asserts that customary international law is part of federal common law.1 '
This assertion reflects the path U.S. courts have chosen in recent years
when defining their competence to apply international legal principles to
particular cases. Early cases, including The Nereide,12 United States v.
Smith13 and The Paquete Habana,14 established the now "unexceptionable"
proposition 15 that the "law of nations" is included in the federal common
law of the United States.
16
At issue in The Nereide was whether a Spanish shipper's goods carried
aboard a British merchant vessel captured by American privateers could be
condemned as prize. The shipper argued that, because Spain was a neutral
party in the fighting between the United States and Great Britain and
because the law of nations protected the property of neutrals, his property
could not be taken as prize. 17 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the
Supreme Court, argued that, absent Congressional legislation, "the Court
is bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law of the land."18
Although this statement appears to conclude that international law is part
of the general laws of the United States, Marshall was sitting in admiralty
and thereby his statement can be read as addressing only whether interna-
tional law applies in admiralty cases. 19
Smith involved a prosecution for piracy involving the "plunder and
robbery" of a Spanish vessel.20 Thomas Smith, having participated in the
piracy of the Spanish vessel, was prosecuted under an 1819 Act of Con-
gress which stated, "That if any person or persons whatsoever, shall, on the
high seas, commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations...
every such offender or offenders shall, upon conviction thereof.., be pun-
11. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTM STATES §§ 111,
112 (rev. ed. 1987). See also Casto, supra note 2, at 480, 492, 511, nn.64-67, n.142,
n.248; Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United
States, 101 U. P, L. REv. 26 (1952); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary
International Law of Federal Law After Erie, 66 FoRDHAM L. REv. 393 (1997). Cf. Curtis
A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Hv. L. REv. 815, 834-36 (1997) (describing the
Third Restatement's approach as without precedent and as doctrinal "bootstrapping").
12. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815).
13. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
14. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
15. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards,
J., concurring).
16. The fact that Smith was a piracy case in admiralty and that The Paquete Habana
and The Nereide were prize cases in admiralty are particularly important for the pur-
poses of this Note.
17. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 388-90.
18. Id. at 423.
19. See infra Parts III.A, III.B (explaining that the separate jurisdictional category for
admiralty cases in Article III, contemplating cognizance of some international law rules,
must be considered as distinct from the "laws of the United States" category).
20. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 153-55.
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ished with death."21 The jury returned a special verdict finding that Smith
was involved in the plunder and robbery, and that if these actions consti-
tuted "piracy" under the 1819 Act, a question of law, he would be in viola-
tion of the Act.22 Addressing the legal question, Justice Joseph Story,
writing for the Supreme Court, found that Smith's acts constituted piracy
"as defined by the law of nations."23
Before reaching this conclusion, Story was required to consider
whether the 1819 Act was constitutionally infirm, for the Constitution
gives Congress the power to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies com-
mitted on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations."
24
Smith argued "that Congress is bound to define, in terms, the offense of
piracy, and is not at liberty to leave it to be ascertained by judicial interpre-
tation."25 Story, however, found the task assigned to the judiciary by Con-
gress in the 1819 Act to be no different than finding the meaning of a word
in any congressional command.26 He determined that ascertaining the
meaning of piracy was similar to other common law means of interpreting
and applying a statute and its terms.
27
Finding that Congress could allow the judiciary to determine the
meaning of statutory terms by reference to the "law of nations," Story set
forth the now oft-quoted method for ascertaining the "law of nations."
Courts may ascertain the law of nations "by consulting the works of
jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and prac-
tice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognising and enforcing that
law."28 From examining a variety of sources in each category, Story con-
cluded that Smith's actions fell within those universally treated as piracy in
violation of the law of nations.29
A similar approach to ascertaining the law of nations was adopted in
The Paquete Habana.30 The Paquete Habana was a fishing vessel sailing
under the Spanish flag captured off the coast of Cuba by a U.S. gunboat.31
21. Id. at 154, n. a.
22. Id. at 154-55.
23. Id. at 163.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
25. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 158.
26. Id. at 159.
27. Id. at 158-59. Although subsequent cases have relied on justice Story's search of
the common law through which he defined piracy, his holding could have been based
on purely domestic and statutory law, making the determination of the law of nations
merely dicta. Story argues that a 1790 act of Congress, ch. 9, sec. 8, declared "that
robbery and murder committed on the high seas shall be deemed piracy." Id. at 158,
160. Relying on this statute alone, Story could have held that the jury's finding of "plun-
der and robbery" fit within the congressional definition of piracy. Nonetheless, because
Story was following Congress's command to find the meaning of piracy "as defined by
the law of nations," he may have felt obliged to look beyond the 1790 act and actually
ascertain the law of nations' definition of piracy rather than rely on the previous decla-
ration of Congress.
28. Id. at 160-61.
29. Id. at 161-63.
30. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
31. Id. at 678-79.
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The vessel and her cargo were condemned as prizes of war and later sold at
an auction.3 2 The owner and the master, on behalf of the other crew mem-
bers who were entitled to shares of the Habana's catch, brought a suit chal-
lenging the seizure as unlawful.3 3 The Supreme Court, in order to
determine whether fishing vessels were legally subject to capture during
the war with Spain, looked to the law of nations and found that "coast
fishing vessels.., have been recognized as exempt, with their cargoes and
crews, from capture as prize of war."3 4 This case is particularly significant
because the Court used international law to restrict state action by the
United States. After tracing a significant amount of history on the interna-
tional treatment of fishing vessels as prizes of war to support the holding,
the Court set forth perhaps the most relied upon statement relating to the
justiciability of the "law of nations":
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and adminis-
tered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as ques-
tions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.
For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and
usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists
and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have
made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they
treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the specula-
tions of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustwor-
thy evidence of what the law really is.
3 5
This statement presents three critical rules. First, it reaffirms the proposi-
tion that international law is part of the law of the United States, or at least
its admiralty law. Second, it holds that the court may apply an interna-
tional "law," as controlling authority, even when the "law" has not previ-
ously been recognized in a U.S. treaty, legislative act, executive act, or prior
court decision. Finally, it ratifies the Smith Court's method of consulting
the works of jurists or commentators as a means for ascertaining an inter-
national "law." The Court cautions that only those works purporting to
report the law rather than advocate for the acceptance of a principle should
be consulted. 36 In support of its optimistic view that jurists can accom-
plish such a neutral task, the court cites Wheaton's assurance that jurists
and commentators are "generally impartial in their judgment."
37
32. Id. at 679.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 686.
35. Id. at 700 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163, 164, 214, 215 (1895)). A
similar approach to defining international law is adopted by the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, arts. 38 & 59, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 1062 (1945).
36. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700-01.
37. Id. (citing WHEATON'S INTEmATiONAL LAw § 15 (8th ed.)). Cf. C. Donald John-
son, Jr., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: A Contribution to the Development of Customary Interna-
tional Law by a Domestic Court, 11 GA. J. IN'L & ComP. L. 335, 336-37 (1981) (arguing
"[t]he difficulty of the task [of defining international law] is made more obvious by the
wide variance among academic specialists in the field in approaching the sources of
international law," and describing the "often nebulous law represented by the usage and
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Finally, in analyzing international legal sources concerning the "legal-
ity" of certain war practices, The Paquete Habana Court illustrated a will-
ingness to give international law a dynamic perspective. In other words, it
indicated that the law of nations cannot be analyzed from a static perspec-
tive and that certain standards ripen over time into settled rules of interna-
tional law.38 Consistent with the common law characterization of
international law, the doctrine to be applied by the courts need not be set
in time. Nonetheless, the decision recognizes that a rule will not become a
settled portion of international law unless it commands the "general assent
of civilized nations."39 This "stringent"40 rule is justified, at least in form,
as a means for ensuring that one nation will not "feel free to impose idio-
syncratic legal rules upon others, in the name of applying international
law."
4 1
B. The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Application of the "Law of
Nations"
1. The Statute and its Origins
The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), arising from a provision in the Judiciary
Act of 1789, grants the federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over cases
in which an alien sues for a tort committed in violation of the law of
nations.4 2 The ATCA provides: "The district courts shall have original
practice of nations"); Mark P. Jacobsen, Comment, 28 U.S.C. 1350: A Legal Remedy for
Torture in Paraguay?, 69 GEo. LJ. 833, 834 (1981) (describing the "amorphous law of
nations" and arguing that the application of the ATCA is "restricted ... by difficulty in
defining when an act is governed by the law of nations").
38. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 694.
39. Id.
40. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
41. Id. The Filartiga court found that the situation would have been different had
there not been a general assent of nations on the legal principle involved. Id. Similarly,
in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Supreme Court refused to find an interna-
tional law against a government's expropriation of a foreign-owned corporation's assets,
for there was no general assent on the invalidity of such action. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
See also Josef Rohlik, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: International Justice in a Modern American
Court?, 11 GA. J. INT'L & ComP. L. 325, 330 (1981). But some commentators caution
that the usage of a statute such as the ATCA in any context may invite other, less
friendly nations to assert similar jurisdiction over international law claims and impose
obligations on foreign visitors that could lead to "chaotic or unjust results." See, e.g.,
Farooq Hassan, Note, A Conflict of Philosophies: The Filartiga Jurisprudence, 32 lr'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 250, 257 (1983).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). The separate clause granting jurisdiction over torts
committed in violation of treaties of the United States is beyond the scope of this Note.
Because the provision relating to the law of nations is independent and jurisdiction may
be granted on that basis alone, answers to questions of the constitutionality of the por-
tion relating to the law of nations are not contingent upon the treaty language following
the disjunctive. Nonetheless, it is important to note that even if the use of customary
international law is significantly curtailed by the theory adopted in this Note, interna-
tional law can still play a significant role under the ATCA through treaties. For a recent
case relying exclusively on the treaty clause of the ATCA, see Brancaccio v. Reno, 964 F.
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding that the plaintiff had not and could not show a violation
of the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, for it does not require transfer
of a prisoner upon request).
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jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."4 3 This
grant exists separately from both federal question44 and diversity4 5 juris-
diction, as well as from jurisdiction over admiralty, maritime and prize
cases.
4 6
Little direct evidence of Congress's intentions in enacting this provi-
sion exists to lend guidance to those searching for its meaning.47 The Sen-
ate debates over the Judiciary Act were not recorded and the provision is
never mentioned in the debates of the House of Representatives. 48 Given
that the ATCA's passage immediately followed the ratification of the Con-
stitution, however, the goals of the First Congress can be inferred from
those portions of ratification debates relevant to the law of nations.
49
In the ATCA's more than 200 year history, neither the Supreme Court
nor Congress has guided the judiciary in its application.50 Prior to 1980,
jurisdiction under the ATCA was predicated successfully only two times.
51
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). The original Act, enacted by the First Congress, read:
"The district courts... shall have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several
States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a
tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Judiciary Act
of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, sec. 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994). The original statute granting diversity jurisdiction did
not equate "aliens" with "citizens." Thus, one might argue that the First Congress
intended only to give aliens the same opportunity as citizens would receive under diver-
sity jurisdiction, at least in relation to torts. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 813-14 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994).
47. Judge Friendly has described the Act as an "old but little used section" that is "a
kind of legal Lohengrin;... no one seems to know whence it came." IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,
519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding fraud not a violation of international law).
48. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812 (Bork, J., concurring) (citing 1 Annals of Cong.
782-833 (J. Gales ed., 1789)).
49. See infra Part II.
50. See E. Hardy Smith, Note, Federal Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Claims Act:
Can This Antiquated Statute Fulfill Its Modern Role?, 27 Aiz. L. REv. 437, 438 (1985).
For a discussion of Supreme Court cases that have addressed issues of international law,
see generally Paul B. Stephen III, International Law in the Supreme Court, 1990 Sup. CT.
REv. 133 (1990).
51. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (child custody dispute between
two aliens; wrongful withholding of custody is a tort, and defendant's falsification of
child's passport to procure custody violated the law of nations); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F.
Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (suit for restitution of three slaves who were on board
a Spanish ship seized as a prize of war; treaty of France superseded the law of nations;
§ 1350 alternative basis of jurisdiction). Because a tort must be found to be the type
which violates the law of nations before jurisdiction will be granted, some cases prior to
1980 considered application of the ATCA, but found the alleged tort did not meet the
law of nations threshold. See Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978)
(no generally accepted international rule granting custody of children to grandparents);
Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1978) (negligence
law not part of the law of nations), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); Dreyfus v. Von
Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976) (wrongful confiscation of property not part of the
law of nations), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d. at 1015
(fraud not violative of international law); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Service, Inc. 475 F.2d
142, 145 (7th Cir. 1975) (fraud not violative of the law of nations); Khedivial Line,
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For almost 200 years, therefore, this Act remained essentially dormant.
Though Smith and The Paquete Habana did not involve cases brought
under the ATCA, the standards relating to the law of nations set forth in
those cases are particularly relevant to the interpretation and application of
the ATCA. Most ATCA cases require that courts ascertain what torts are
cognizable as being "committed in violation of the law of nations."
5 2
2. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,53 decided in 1980, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit resurrected the ATCA from its fairly dormant exist-
ence.5 4 Dolly Filartiga, a citizen of the Republic of Paraguay, sued Americo
Norberto Pena-Irala, formerly an Inspector General of Police of Paraguay,
for allegedly kidnaping, torturing, and killing her brother while in office.
55
The alleged actions took place in Paraguay. 56 Filartiga sued, however,
while both she and Pena-Irala were in the United States on visitor's visas.
57
The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.58 The Second Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that deliberate
torture by state officials violates international law and that alleging such
torture creates jurisdiction under the ATCA.5 9 This decision breathed new
S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1960) (illegal picketing not
in violation of international law); Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp.
324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (breach of contract not in violation of the law of nations);
Damaskinos v. Societa Navigacion Interamericana, S.A., Panama, 255 F. Supp. 919, 923
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (negligence law not part of the law of nations); Lopes v. Reederei Rich-
ard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (unseaworthiness doctrine not part
of the law of nations).
52. This Note will not discuss the second clause of the ATCA involving torts "com-
mitted in violation of ... treat[ies] of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). It
should not be presumed, however, that a case will automatically become justiciable once
a violation of a treaty of the United States is alleged. The treaty clause of the ATCA
raises issues of its own, including whether the "treaty" is actually a treaty of the United
States, whether the treaty is self-executing or non-self-executing, and whether the polit-
ical question doctrine or the act of state doctrine bar justiciability. For additional dis-
cussion of the ATCA's treaty clause, see supra note 42.
53. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). For general discussions of the case and its
approach, see, for example, Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction
over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 22 -LuAv. Irr'L LJ. 53 (1981); Hassan, supra note 41; Jacobsen, supra note 37;
Johnson, supra note 37; Rohlik, supra note 41; Dean Rusk, A Comment on Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 311 (1981); Michael C. Small, Note, Enforcing
International Human Rights Law in Federal Courts: The Alien Tort Statute and the Separa-
tion of Powers, 74 GEo. LJ. 163 (1985); Louis B. Sohn, Torture as a Violation of the Law of
Nations, 11 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307 (1981); Gabriel M. Wilner, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala:
Comments on Sources of Human Rights Law and Means of Redress for Violations of Human
Rights, 11 GA.J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 317 (1981).
54. Judge Robb of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit described the Filar-
tiga approach as "judicially will[ing] that statute a new life." Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb, J., concurring).
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life into this rather ancient statute.
The Filartiga court held that "deliberate torture perpetrated under
color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the inter-
national law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties."
60
For the first time, the ATCA was applied in the modern human rights con-
text. Furthermore, Filartiga established that "international law," used by
the court as synonymous with the "law of nations," is an evolving concept
to be ascertained by the courts.6 1 The Second Circuit held that courts
ascertaining the law of nations "must interpret international law not as it
was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the
world today."
62
In order to determine which principles are controlling international
"law," the court accepted the methodology prescribed in Smith and The
Paquete Habana. It looked to general usages and customs of nations, as
evidenced by the works of jurists and commentators, as well as treaties and
declarations or resolutions of multinational bodies, such as the United
Nations. 63 To that extent, the Smith-Paquete Habana methodology was
incorporated as precedent for the interpretation and application of the
ATCA.
3. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic
Shortly after the Second Circuit's ground breaking decision in Filartiga, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit was faced with the similar task of
applying the ATCA in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.6 4 Representatives
of persons killed on a civilian bus in Israel, along with the injured survi-
vors of the attack, sued the Libyan Arab Republic, the Palestine Liberation
Organization, the Palestine Information Office, the National Association of
Arab Americans, and the Palestine Congress of North America.65 The
plaintiffs charged the defendants with miltiple tortious acts in violation of
international law.
6 6
The D.C. Circuit panel unanimously agreed that the court did not
have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' causes of action.67 Each judge, how-
ever, wrote a separate concurring opinion, each positing a different basis
for denying jurisdiction. Judge Edwards, adhering to the Filartiga ration-
ale, argued that violations of the law of nations is a narrow category
60. Id.
61. Id. at 881.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 880-83.
64. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
For a discussion of the case, see generally Debra A. Harvey, Comment, The Alien Tort
Statute: International Human Rights Watchdog or Simply "Historical Trivia"?, 21 J. MAR-
sHALL L. REv. 341, 349-52 (1988); Kenneth Marc Schneider, Note, Hanoch Tel-Oren: The
Retreat From Filartiga, 4 CARDozo L. REv. 665 (1983).
65. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 544-45 (D.D.C. 1981). For
a discussion of the district court opinion, see generally Eileen Rose Pollock, Terrorism as
a Tort in Violation of the Law of Nations, 6 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 236 (1982).
66. Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 544.
67. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775.
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reserved to "a handful of heinous actions - each of which violates defina-
ble, universal and obligatory norms," 68 and that the actions in this case did
not trigger such jurisdiction.69 Edwards cautioned, however, that when a
proper cause of action satisfies the requirements of the ATCA, the judiciary
should exercise jurisdiction.70
Judge Robb relied primarily on the political question doctrine in his
concurrence, asserting that an exercise of jurisdiction would improperly
involve the judiciary in foreign affairs, an area outside of its expertise and
one wrought with the danger of interference with the political branches. 71
Furthermore, Judge Robb rejected the Filartiga formulation for ascertain-
ing international law under the ATCA72 and, in the process, rejected the
holding of The Paquete Habana.73 Citing Chief Justice Fuller's dissent in
The Paquete Habana,74 Robb stated that:
Courts ought not to serve as debating clubs for professors willing to argue
over what is or what is not an accepted violation of the law of nations. Yet
this appears to be the clear result if we allow plaintiffs the opportunity to
proceed under § 1350.... The typical judge or jury would be swamped in
citations to various distinguished journals of international legal studies, but
would be left with little more than a numbing sense of how varied is the
world of public international 'law.'75
Absent congressional guidelines to clarify the ATCA's application or pur-
pose, Judge Robb saw no opportunity for judicial cognizance under the
statute.76
Judge Bork, also concurring in a separate opinion, found that the
ATCA merely provides a forum and did not provide a separate and auto-
matic private cause of action for violations of international law.77 Alterna-
tively stated, even though international law may be part of the federal
common law, it is not of the type, such as in torts or contracts, that allows
judges to fashion a remedy. Instead it merely provides rules of decision.78
Furthermore, Bork found no other statute or binding international law
relied upon by the plaintiffs that conferred a right to a cause of action in
68. Id. at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 775-98. See also Beanel v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.
La. 1997) (accepting a broader scope of the law of nations, which included action by
private individuals, but dismissing for failure to state a claim under the ATCA upon
which relief can be granted).
70. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 789 (Edwards, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 827 ("We ought not to cobble together for [the ATCA] a modern mission
on the vague idea that international law develops over the years. Law may evolve, but
statutes ought not to mutate.").
73. Id. at 827.
74. 175 U.S. 677, 720 (Fuller, J., dissenting) (stating that it was "needless to review
the speculations and repetitions of writers on international law.... Their lucubrations
may be persuasive, but are not authoritative.").
75. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 827 (Robb, J., concurring).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 799 (Bork, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 811.
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the case.79 According to Bork, courts, in light of principles of separation of
powers, should be especially adamant against finding a cause of action
where none is directly conferred.80 Because there exists "sufficient contro-
versy of a politically sensitive nature about the content of any relevant inter-
national legal principles" involved in the litigation, Bork felt it would be
improper to adjudicate those claims.81 Thus, because international law is
wrought with political questions, it is not the court's province to create
clarity from confusion.
Finally, Judge Bork also expressed concern, in dicta, over the appro-
priate scope of international law in light of rules of statutory construc-
tion.82 He argued that "one might suppose" that the meaning of "law of
nations" in the ATCA dealt with the three kinds of offenses understood to
constitute the whole of international law at the Founding: violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.83 Fur-
thermore, Bork noted that this list is consistent with the specific categories
enumerated in Article 111.84
4. Kadic v. Karadzic
Despite the brief retreat evidenced in Tel-Oren, the expansion of the judicial
application of the ATCA reached new heights in 1995 with the Kadic v.
Karadzic decision.85 The plaintiffs in Kadic were Croat and Muslim citi-
79. Id. at 808-19.
80. Id. at 801-05.
81. Id. at 808. Judge Bork further stated, "Adjudication of those claims would
require the analysis of international legal principles that are anything but clearly defined
and that are the subject of controversy touching 'sharply on national nerves."' Id. at 805
(citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1963)).
82. Id. at 813.
83. Id. at 813-14 (citing 4 WLLIAM BLAcKsToNE, COMMENTAmES *68, 72, quoted in 1
W.W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND CONs-rITUIoN IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 459
(1953)).
84. Id.
85. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996). The peculiarity of this case and the ATCA was summed
up in Judge Newman's introduction to the opinion when he stated, "Most Americans
would probably be surprised to learn that victims of atrocities committed in Bosnia are
suing the leader of the insurgent Bosnian-Serb forces in a United States District Court in
Manhattan." Id. at 236. A number of case notes and articles have been published on the
Kadic opinion. See, e.g.,Judith Hippler Bello et al., International Decision, 90 AM.J. INT'L
L. 658 (1996); David S. Bloch, Dangers of Righteousness: Unintended Consequences of
Kadic v. Karadzic, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 35 (1996) (arguing that, while interna-
tional law litigation in U.S. courts is generally good, Kadic itself "muddies international
law, weakens American diplomacy and strengthens the very outlaws it is intended to
attack"); Pamala Brondos, Note, International Law - The Use of the Torture Victim Protec-
tion Act as an Enforcement Mechanism, 32 LAND & WAR L. REv. 221 (1997); Amy E.
Eckert, Note, Kadic v. Karadzic: Whose International Law?, 25 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y
173 (1996) (concluding Kadic went too far); Alan Frederick Enslen, Note, Filartiga's
Offspring: The Second Circuit Significantly Expands the Scope of the Alien Tort Claim Act
with Its Decision in Kadic v. Karadzic, 48 ALA. L. REv. 695 (1997); Justin Lu, Note, Juris-
diction over Non-State Activity Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
531 (1997).
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zens of Bosnia-Herzegovina.8 6 They alleged that they were victims, and
representatives of victims, of various atrocities including rape, torture, and
summary executions by the Bosnian-Serb military forces.8 7 The suit was
brought against Karadzic, in his capacity as the President of the Bosnian-
Serb faction, and he was served while at the United Nations in New York.
88
The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion.8 9 The Second Circuit reversed this ruling90 and, as a consequence,
greatly expanded the jurisdiction conferred by the ATCA - at least within
the Second Circuit.91
The Second Circuit held that the ATCA applies to actions by state
actors or private individuals that are in violation of customary interna-
tional law.92 According to the Kadic court, state action is not necessary for
a cognizable violation of the law of nations to exist.93 The court accepted
the principles it adopted earlier in Filartiga, noting that international law is
constantly evolving and consulting a similar list of authorities to ascertain
the norms of contemporary international law.94 As a result, the court
relied upon various international conventions, declarations, and resolu-
tions to determine that the acts alleged - including genocide, torture, and
rape - constituted violations of generally accepted norms of international
law.95
Aside from the international law claims, the plaintiffs also sought
relief under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), enacted in 1992 by
the U.S. Congress.96 The TVPA creates a cause of action for official torture
and extrajudicial killing:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of
any foreign nation -
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for dam-
ages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to the individual's legal representative, or to any person
who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.
9 7
As the court recognized, the TVPA's plain language extends only to official
actors and not to purely private individuals. 98 This act is not jurisdic-
tional, but instead is an example of a cause of action arising under the
86. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236.
87. Id. at 236-37.
88. Id. at 237.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 251.
91. See Charles F. Marshall, Reframing the Alien Tort Act After Kadic v. Karadzic, 21
N.C. J. Irr'L L. & COM. REG. 591, 597 (1996).
92. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 238-39.
95. Id. at 241-44.
96. Id. at 245.
97. Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994), 106 Stat. 73
(1992).
98. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245-46.
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jurisdictional grant of the ATCA.9 9 However, because the court neither
considered state action a pre-condition to its creation of a remedy, nor lim-
ited its search for "law" to statutes passed by Congress, the TVPA was not
essential to its decision.
5. Selected Post-Kadic Applications of the ATCA
In 1996, two circuit courts were faced with applying the ATCA. In Abebe-
Jira v. Negewo, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a
decision awarding compensatory and punitive damages for "torture and
cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment, pursuant to the Alien Tort
Claims Act."'10 0 Negewo served as chairman of Higher Zone 9, one of
twenty-five governing units dividing Ethiopia's capital and created by the
Dergue dictatorship in that country. 1 1 The plaintiffs suffered various
atrocities, including torture and beatings during interrogations, at the
hands of Higher Zone 9 guards. The district court found that Negewo per-
sonally supervised or participated directly in at least some of the
interrogations.1
0 2
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the ATCA "establishes a federal
forum where courts may fashion domestic common law remedies to give
effect to violations of customary international law."'1 3 Finding that the
political question doctrine only prevents the courts from deciding issues
"textually committed to the legislative or executive branches," 10 4 the court
determined that it could take cognizance of the tort action at bar.
10 5
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit revisited its applica-
tion of the ATCA 10 6 in 1996, with two separate decisions (from appeals
addressing different issues) in the case of Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos. 10 7 Opponents of the Marcos regime in the Philippines sued for
violations of their human rights, alleging they were victims of torture. The
jury found that the plaintiffs and the victims they represented had been
99. Id. at 246; see also Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 178 (D. Mass. 1995).
100. 72 F.3d 844, 845 (1996).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 845-46.
103. Id. at 848.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 337 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the "political question doctrine did not bar a tort action instituted against Nicara-
guan contra leaders")).
106. See Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litiga-
tion), 978 F.2d 493, 501-03 (9th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Estate 1], cert. denied, 508 U.S.
972 (1993); Hilao v. Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litiga-
tion), 25 F.3d 1467, 1472-74 (9th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Estate II], cert. denied, 115
S.Ct. 934 (1995). For a discussion of Trajano v. Marcos, see Sung Teak Kim, Note, Adju-
dicating Violations of International Law: Defining the Scope of Jurisdiction Under the Alien
Tort Statute - Trajano v. Marcos, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 387 (1994).
107. 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Estate 111]; 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir.
1996) [hereinafter Estate 1I. See also John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (upholding subject matter jurisdiction under ATCA based on allega-
tions that an American oil company, acting in concert with the Burmese government,
committed various civil and human rights abuses).
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subjected to a range of tortures under the authority of Marcos, including
summary execution, arbitrary detention and other atrocities during inter-
rogations, some of which were conducted by Marcos himself.108
Applying its earlier test that "[a]ctionable violations of international
law [under the ATCA] must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and
obligatory," 10 9 the Ninth Circuit found that the international norm against
torture and arbitrary detention was sufficiently specific to be actionable
under the ATCA. 110 Applying the methodology endorsed in The Paquete
Habana"1 to determine the content of international law, the court refer-
enced the following international documents: Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment; the American Convention on Human Rights; the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms; and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
112
While the use of international law in judicial decision-making is not
new, these cases illustrate that the law of nations is gaining an increasing
presence in the jurisprudence of American courts through the ATCA. The
early cases, however, can be distinguished from the ATCA cases. In other
words, the ATCA is the vehicle by which the use of international law is
receiving a constitutionally illegitimate mutation. Part II describes the con-
stitutional structure from which this conclusion can be drawn.
II. The "Law of Nations" and the Constitution
A. The Framers' Understanding of the Scope of the "Law of Nations"
To understand the intended scope of jurisdictional provisions employing
the "law of nations" language, such as the ATCA, it is necessary to examine
both the Framers' goals as well as the meaning of "law of nations" in
1789.113 Because the "law of nations" at the Founding did not incorporate
the concept of human rights, it was not Congress's intention to protect
those rights with the 1789 Act.1
14
It is clear that Congress's understanding of the law of nations in 1789
was far different than the broad scheme of internationalism embraced by
many scholars and officials today. First, in 1789 and, in essence, during
the entire period prior to World War II, the law of nations did not embrace
108. See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F. Supp.
1460, 1462-63 (D. Haw. 1995).
109. Estate IV, 103 F.3d at 794 (citing Estate 11, 25 F.3d at 1475).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 794-95 (citing Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,
715 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700)).
112. Id.
113. Congress's intentions, however, are somewhat irrelevant, for neither the First
Congress nor any subsequent Congress retains the power to expand jurisdiction beyond
the enumeration of Article 11. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
114. A.H. ROBERTSON, HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 2 (1982) (classic international
law, especially as developed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had no
place for protection of human rights).
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any concept of human rights." 5 Customary international law did not
even recognize private parties as legal personalities, thereby precluding
them from recovering for violations of the law of nations. 116 Given those
fundamental limitations, the Framers could not have intended that the stat-
ute would extend to tortious "human rights" violations. Instead, the law of
nations was quite limited in subject matter and was seen as an issue of the
obligations and actions of states. Blackstone's writings further illustrate
the limited conception of international law during the Founding era. He
defined an exclusive list of three principle offenses against the law of
nations: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassa-
dors, and piracy.' 1 7 Each of these fits within one of the enumerated juris-
dictional categories of Article 111,118 indicating that the Framers
contemplated which areas of international law would be fit for judicial
resolution.
Independent of questions regarding the scope of the "law of nations,"
many commentators agree that one of the principle motivations behind the
First Congress's creation of the ATCA was to ensure that a federal forum
existed for decisions affecting international law.1' 9 The Framers of the
Constitution sought to give the national government the ultimate voice over
foreign affairs. 120 This argument supports the conclusion that the ATCA
was intended as a means for ensuring that national courts could hear
issues affecting international relations. 12 1 It would have been important to
create such jurisdiction because the original design of the judiciary relied
on a system where most cases originated in state trial courts.122 The pre-
sumption was that, absent legislation to the contrary, most trials would
occur in state courts.12 3 This explanation, however, provides no insight
115. Id. See also Wilner, supra note 53, at 320 ("The notion that all individuals have
rights independent of what may be granted to them under national law ... adds a
dimension to international law unknown to it when the sources of the law of nations
were set forth in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.").
116. See H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 6-7 (1968); ROBERT-
SON, supra note 114, at 2; Wilner, supra note 53, at 320.
117. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAmES *68, *72.
118. Violation of safe conducts and piracy fit within admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion; and the rights of ambassadors fit within jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassa-
dors, public ministers and counsels. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
119. See, e.g., Casto, supra note 2, at 480; Harvey, supra note 64, at 343-44.
120. See Casto, supra note 2, at 480; Harvey, supra note 64, at 343-44. Some authors,
such as Casto and Harvey, argue that because the Framers attributed great importance
to national control over foreign affairs, those drafting the ATCA were attempting to give
the national courts power to address everything international. See id. This argument,
however, makes a tremendous leap. While the Framers wanted federal control over for-
eign affairs, they did not necessarily want federaljudicial control over this area, at least
not in a general sense without recognition of the powers of the federal government's
political branches. See infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
121. See Harvey, supra note 64, at 343 ("The framers who participated in the Consti-
tutional Convention wanted the federal courts - not the state courts - to address inter-
national law issues.") (citing Dickinson, supra note 11, at 38).
122. See Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L.
REv. 1205, 1223 (1988).
123. See Casto, supra note 2, at 508, 515-19.
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into the proper scope of the judicial power over international affairs or the
proper scope of judicial power under the ATCA. It only explains that where
the "law of nations" is appropriate for judicial interpretation, a federal
court rather than a state court will have the opportunity to fashion that
construction.
Courts, as a matter of construction, should avoid broad or expansive
interpretations of jurisdictional statutes.1 24 The historical background,
combined with this principle of construction, reveals that courts should
predicate jurisdiction on the ATCA for only a narrow class of cases.
B. The Constitutional Text and the "Law of Nations"
1. Article III: The Judiciary's Authority Extends Only to Enumerated
Categories
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution defines the parameters of the judi-
cial branch's authority stating, "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority ... ," and that it shall extend to a few additional enumerated
areas of jurisdiction.' 25 The enumeration of judicial power in Article III
constitutes the "entire mass" of the judicial branch's authority,126 and as
124. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959).
Writing for the Court in a case not involving the ATCA, Justice Frankfurter stated:
The considerations of history and policy which investigation has illuminated are
powerfully reinforced by the deeply felt and traditional reluctance of this Court
to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts through a broad reading of juris-
dictional statutes. A reluctance which must be even more forcefully felt when
the expansion is proposed, for the first time, eighty-three years after the jurisdic-
tion has been conferred.
See also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (stating that "When courts lack such evidence [of Congressional intent], to
'construe' is to legislate, to act in the dark, and hence to do many things that, it is virtu-
ally certain, Congress did not intend. Any correspondence between the will of Congress
in 1789 and the decisions of the courts in 1984 can then only be accidental.").
125. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. This section reads:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion; - to Controversies between two or more States; - between a State and
Citizens of another State; - between citizens of different States; - between Citi-
zens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. ...
Id.
126. Hamilton indicated that this list of "arising under" authorities is exclusive in
several instances. "[The federal judiciary] is to comprehend, 'all cases .... .' This consti-
tutes the entire mass of the judicial authority of the union." THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at
538-39 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis added) (discussing
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Hamilton stated, the courts cannot extend their authority beyond this spe-
cific grant of power:
[T]he judicial authority of the federal judicatures, is declared by the consti-
tution to comprehend certain cases particularly specified. The expression
of those cases marks the precise limits beyond which the federal courts can-
not extend their jurisdiction; because the objects of their cognizance being
enumerated, the specification would be nugatory if it did not exclude all
ideas of more extensive authority.
12 7
To that extent, authority for adjudicating the "law of nations" must be
found in Article III. Under the concept that international law is part of the
federal common law,128 many courts applying the ATCA have used the
"arising under ... laws of the United States" clause to justify Article III
jurisdiction over human rights claims and other portions of international
law not falling within a separate category of Article III jurisdiction.1 29 The
legitimacy of such a construction is called into question, however, when
Article III is considered in its entirety.
The law of nations plays a role in four categories of enumerated cases
to which Article III of the Constitution grants jurisdictional authority to the
judiciary: cases or controversies arising under treaties of the United States;
cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls; cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and controversies between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 130 However,
no general subject-matter grant over this area exists. In fact, the enumera-
tion of particular areas in which the law of nations is involved negates a
the classes of enumerated cases to which the judiciary's authority extended). Hamilton
also described Article III authority as involving "the particular powers of the federal judi-
ciary.... ." Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
127. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 560 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
See also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (Justice Story stated
"The government... can claim no povers which are not granted to it by the constitu-
tion, and the powers actually granted, must be such as are expressly given, or given by
necessary implication.")
128. See supra Part I.A.
129. This analysis was used by each of the courts in the cases discussed supra Part
I.B.
130. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Weisburd articulated the proposition that these catego-
ries each involved the law of nations, stating:
First, without regard to article III's grant of jurisdiction in cases arising under
the laws of the United States, the federal jurisdictional power clearly extended to
much of the law of nations by reason of the other portions of article III. For
example, treaty questions were seen as involving the law of nations; article III
gives jurisdiction over cases involving treaties. Admiralty law was an element of
the law of nations; admiralty jurisdiction is expressly granted in article III. The
law of nations was seen as providing special protections to ambassadors; article
III expressly grants jurisdiction over cases involving ambassadors. Finally, the
Framers could rely on the diversity jurisdiction to bring into the federal courts
many cases involving the law of nations in its law merchant aspect because such
cases were particularly likely to involve local people litigating against people
from either other states or other countries.
Cornell International Law Journal
presumption that such a general grant could exist.13 ' If the law of nations
was included in the laws of the United States, the inclusion of these four
additional categories of jurisdiction would be redundant. 132
For example, admiralty law is a category distinct from the "laws of the
United States," 133 yet one that is clearly an element of the law of
nations. 134 Prize cases involve the application of the admiralty subcat-
egory of international law. Therefore, if a general grant over the "law of
nations" is included in the "laws of the United States," then the federal
courts could obtain jurisdiction over these admiralty cases without a sepa-
rate enumeration of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. If one accepts
that the laws of the United States generally incorporate international law,
then one must also accept that the admiralty jurisdictional clause is unnec-
essary and, to that extent, superfluous. Certainly that cannot be an appro-
priate outcome for the construction of the Constitution. 1
35
Historical records providing insight into the Framers' intentions offer
further support for the proposition that only certain areas of international
law were to be within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. In
certain passages of The Federalist and other founding documents, the
Framers discussed the judiciary's cognizance of the law of nations, but
never in a general sense. 136 Thus, neither The Federalist nor any passage of
Weisburd, supra note 122, at 1222.
131. See THE FEDERAI.ST No. 83, supra note 127 and accompanying text. This canon
of construction, that expression of one is exclusion of the other, derives from the Latin
phrase, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETA-
TION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 25 (1997). See also DonaldJ. Kochan, Book Note,
The Other Side of the Coin: Implications for Policy Formation in the Law of Judicial Inter-
pretation: A Review of A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, 6 CoR-
NELL J.L & PUB. POL'Y 463, 466-67 (1997) (discussing Scalia's arguments on canons of
construction and restoring constitutional provisions to their original meaning).
132. See Weisburd, supra note 122, at 1223. Weisburd argues:
[Clases involving treaties, admiralty, and ambassadors were all seen in 1789 as
presenting questions arising under the law of nations. If the phrase, 'laws of the
United States' had been thought to include the law of nations, the Framers
would not have needed to spell out the categories of jurisdiction that they did
spell out. Further, their designation of particular aspects of the law of nations
as within federal jurisdiction suggests that the Framers took pains to make
explicit the parts of that body of law that they particularly wished to come
before the federal courts. Therefore, attaching significance to the Framer's omis-
sion of what is now called customary international law is not unreasonable.
Id.
133. The Supreme Court has stated that, "[a] case in admiralty does not, in fact, arise
under the constitution or laws of the United States. These cases are as old as navigation
itself; and the law admiralty and maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied by our
courts to the cases as they arise." American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511,
545-46 (1828).
134. See Dickinson, supra note 11, at 28-29; Weisburd, supra note 122, at 1222.
135. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 501, 507 (1995). See also Platt v.
Union Pacific R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 48, 58 (1879) ("Congress is not to be presumed to have
used words for no purpose .... [T]he admitted rules of statutory construction declare
that a legislature is presumed to have used no superfluous words. Courts are to accord a
meaning, if possible, to every word in a statute.").
136. See THE FEDERAIST Nos. 80, 83, at 536-38, 568 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961). For example, Hamilton in Federalist No. 80 talked about the law of
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the recorded debates discusses the law of nations as a portion of "the laws
of the United States," unless so designated by Congress under its Article I,
Section 8 power. Moreover, the law of nations was understood to play a
role in only the four enumerated categories of subject-matter jurisdiction
described above. 137 Thus, the law of nations may be a legitimate concern
for the judiciary in these certain cases, but no general grant of jurisdiction
to decide cases in tort based on the law of nations exists in the Constitu-
tion. Furthermore, Congress cannot establish a general grant of jurisdic-
tion to decide cases in international tort because it cannot extend
jurisdiction to the courts beyond the bounds of the Constitution through
statutes such as the ATCA. 138
Comparing the final version of Article III with its early drafts further
illustrates the absence of an intent to grant the judiciary general jurisdic-
tion over the "law of nations." On May 29, 1789, Edmund Randolph of
Virginia proposed a resolution that included a grant of jurisdiction to the
federal judiciary to hear and determine "questions which may involve the
national peace and harmony."139 This proposal and other similar vague
and general grants of jurisdictional power were duly replaced, consistent
with the Framers' focus on limiting power through enumeration, by the
more specific grant currently embodied in Article III.
The enumeration also makes sense in light of the Framers' under-
standing of the "law of nations" at the Founding. Because it touches on
only three types of conduct in well-defined areas of international law with
developed doctrine, there existed little danger of the judiciary legislating or
interfering with foreign affairs powers by allowing the courts to interpret
the "laws of nations" relevant to those areas.
nations as being part of federal law, but in the context of the enumerated categories
discussed in this Part of this Note. THE FEDmuALST No. 80, supra, at 536-38. See also
Weisburd, supra note 122, at 1222, n.79 (stating that, "Hamilton apparently believed
that the federal courts' authority to hear cases involving the law of nations flowed from
the grant of diversity jurisdiction and the grants of jurisdiction over treaty questions and
cases involving ambassadors, with the federal question grant simply not relevant to this
subject.").
137. See supra notes 83-84, 117-18, 130-32 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
139. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 32
(Bicentennial ed., Norton 1987) (reporting for May 29, 1787). This language survived a
motion again onJune 13. Id. at 112, 116-17. OnJuly 18, the jurisdiction of the national
judiciary was again considered, and to satisfy criticisms about the definition, the resolu-
tion was altered. It read: "[J]urisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under the Natl.
laws: And to such other questions as may involve the Natl. peace & harmony." Id. at
319. "Under the national laws" was replaced with "under laws passed by the general
legislature" and the word "may" was removed in a resolution adopted on July 21. Id. at
383. After consideration by the Committee of Detail, the next reported version has no
mention of the more vague and general grant of jurisdiction over questions relating to
national peace and harmony. Instead, this version presents a much more detailed and
enumerated jurisdictional grant that resembles the adopted language of Article I. Only
a few alterations were made later, primarily on August 27. Id. at 393, 482-83. But see
Casto, supra note 2, at 514 (arguing that this original draft is evidence of a desire to
grant the judiciary broad authority).
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2. Congress's Exclusive Authority to Define Those "Laws of Nations" That
Form a Portion of the "Laws of the United States"
Article I, Section 8, clause 10 of the Constitution states that "The Congress
shall have the Power ... to define and punish Piracies and Felonies com-
mitted on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations."140 The
Framers saw this as a significant improvement on the Articles of Confeder-
ation, and inserted this clause primarily to ensure that the federal govern-
ment retained the power to deal with foreign nations and to prevent any
one State from frustrating national policy on international relations.
14 1
They recognized that effective diplomatic relations required the govern-
ment to speak with one voice. Multiple voices are likely to be divergent
voices, creating confusion and the possibility of embroiling the nation in
international conflicts.
During the constitutional debates, it was further recognized that the
law of nations is often too vague and indeterminate to act as a legal princi-
ple, and instead it must be defined by Congress before it could be consid-
ered a controlling doctrine. 142 The Framers further understood that only
portions of the law of nations might be appropriate "laws" binding the con-
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. See also L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFAIRS AND THE CON-
STnON 72-74 (1972) (Congress has power to define offenses against the law of
nations).
141. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 280-81 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Madison states that:
The power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas, and offences against the law of nations, belongs with equal propriety to the
general government; and is still a greater improvement on the articles of confed-
eration. These articles [of confederation] contain no provision for the case of
offenses against the law of nations; and consequently leave it in the power of
any indiscreet member to embroil the confederacy with foreign nations.
Id. He also provided a further example indicating the importance of domestic defini-
tions of law, stating:
The provision of the federal articles on the subject of piracies and felonies,
extends no farther than to the establishment of courts for the trial of these
offences. The definition of piracies might perhaps without inconveniency, be
left to the law of nations; though, a legislative definition of them, is found in
most municipal codes. A definition of felonies on the high seas is evidently
requisite. Felony is a term of loose signification even in the common law of
England; and of various import in the statute law of that kingdom. But neither
the common, nor the statute law of that or of any other nation ought to be a stan-
dard for the proceedings of this, unless previously made its own by legislative
adoption.
Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
142. MADISON, supra note 139, at 637 (reporting for September 14, 1787). The follow-
ing discourse on Art. I, § 8, cl. 10, during the debates is particularly relevant:
[On the clause] To define & punish piracies and felonies on the high seas, and
'punish' offences against the law of nations.
Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to strike out 'punish' before the words 'offences agst.
the law of nations,' so as to let these be definable as well as punishable, by virtue
of the preceding member of the sentence.
Mr. WILSON hoped that the alteration would by no means be made. To pretend
to define the law of nations which depended on the authority of all the civilized
nations of the world, would have a look of arrogance, that would make us
ridiculous.
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duct of the United States.143 The political branches, the Executive and
Congress, were given the power to determine which international laws
should bind the actions of the United States. Moreover, expressing a sensi-
tivity to the volatility of international relations, the legislature was recog-
nized as the proper branch for making such decisions.144 Inherent in a
political decision is also the ability to alter that decision. A judicial pro-
nouncement that a law is binding upon all nations lacks such flexibility.
Under this construction, cases arising under the law of nations should
only become cognizable by the courts under the general laws of the United
States when Congress, by the power granted in Article I, section 8, clause
10, has defined and thus incorporated an international law into the laws of
the United States. The Framers felt that the federal government must have
supreme authority over relations with foreign nations in order to prevent
individual states from thrusting the United States into international con-
flicts.145 The power to define and punish offenses against the law of
nations was, therefore, placed exclusively in the hands of Congress. 146 Any
broad reading of the ATCA would allow the judiciary the same power of
interference that the Constitution withheld from the individual States, by
precluding them from conducting foreign affairs. As Judge Bork stated,
"[T]hose who drafted the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789
wanted to open federal courts to aliens for the purpose of avoiding, not
provoking, conflicts with other nations... A broad reading of section 1350
Mr. GOVr. [MORRIS] The word define is proper when applied to offences in this
case; the law of nations being often too vague and deficient to be a rule.
On the question to strike out the word 'punish' it passed in the affirmative
N.H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. NJ. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay.
Md. no. Vt. no. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. no.
Id.
143. THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 364 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Madison states:
A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a federal represen-
tative, and which has not been mentioned, is that of foreign affairs. In regulat-
ing our own commerce he ought to be not only acquainted with the treaties
between the United States and other nations, but also with the commercial pol-
icy and laws of other nations. He ought not to be altogether ignorant of the law
of nations, for that as far as it is a proper object of municipal legislation is submit-
ted to the federal government.
Id. (emphasis added).
144. James Iredell (Marcus), Answers to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New Constitu-
tion, Recommended by the Late Convention (Newbern, Hodge and Wills, 1788), reprinted
in PAMPHLErS ON THE CONSTTUION 359 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888). Iredell states,
[C]ertainly the cases enumerated wherein the Congress are empowered either to
define offences, or prescribe punishments, are such as are proper for the exer-
cise of such authority in the general Legislature of the Union. They only relate
to . . . 'piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against
the law of nations.'.. .These are offences immediately affecting the security, the
honor or the interest of the United States at large, and of course must come
within the sphere of the Legislative authority which is intrusted with their
protection.
Id.
145. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 141, at 280-81.
146. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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runs directly contrary to that desire."147 Given the potency of decisions
relating to the law of nations, the Framers sought to centralize the power
and allow for unified policy in this area.
This reading also strengthens the presumption that the Framers
intended to enumerate those areas in which the judiciary could ascertain
the "law of nations" without a Congressional declaration. By doing so,
they limited the amount of interference possible by the judicial branch in
the normal conduct of foreign affairs, while also allowing Congress to fash-
ion rules should it wish to limit the judiciary's role in those enumerated
areas.
III. Toward a Structurally Consistent Use of International Law in the
Courts under the ATCA
A. A Two-Step Jurisdictional Analysis: If Neither B Nor C, "Do Not Pass
Go, Do Not Collect $200"148
Under the structural constitutional analysis of the previous Part, jurisdic-
tion can be granted under the "law of nations" component of the ATCA in
limited circumstances. Assuming all other requirements of the ATCA are
met and that the plaintiff alleges a violation of the law of nations (as
opposed to a treaty), jurisdiction should be granted only if a court can
answer affirmatively one of the two following questions: 1) Is the plaintiff
seeking a remedy for a tort only committed in violation of the law of
nations and does the case fall under a category of Article III which this
Note shall call "special jurisdiction" - that is does the case sound in admi-
ralty or maritime, or does the case involve a foreign minister, counsel, or
ambassador, or is the case brought against a citizen of the United States by
an alien who is a citizen of a foreign state? Or, 2) If the case does not fall
within any area of special jurisdiction under Article III and the plaintiff is
thus relying on the jurisdictional authority of the "laws of the United
States,"149 is the plaintiff seeking a remedy for a tort only committed in
violation of a law of nations as defined by Congress under its Article I,
Section 8, Clause 10 authority? 150 If the answer to both questions is "no,"
147. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812-13 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton)).
148. Like the player in a game of Monopoly who is sent to Jail, the judiciary cannot
move forward if a case lies outside its jurisdiction and must remain caged by the bars
which form the confines of constitutional power. Just as a player cannot collect $200
precisely because he cannot pass the necessary threshold, the "Go" square, a plaintiff
cannot collect if he cannot meet the jurisdictional threshold enumerated in Article III of
the U.S. Constitution.
149. The Constitution itself does not proscribe any conduct as being violative of the
law of nations, and treaties are separately listed in the ATCA. Therefore, if a plaintiff
falls outside of the categories of special jurisdiction, then only the "laws of the United
States" may be considered as the authority-granting provision in Article II.
150. For a discussion of the separation of powers and federalism implications ofjudi-
cial use of customary international law, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 11. Brad-
ley and Goldsmith refer only in passing to the ATCA, but set forth a strong argument
that, "in the absence of political branch authorization, [customary international law] is
not a source of federal law." Id. at 870. The authors also concede, however, that the
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jurisdiction under the ATCA cannot be triggered. None of the cases dis-
cussed previously in this Note recognize such a restrictive set of prelimi-
nary questions to determine jurisdiction. Yet these two questions seem to
create the only legitimate threshold inquiry under the constitutional
structure.
Because the ATCA must fit within the confines of Article III, this two-
step analysis seeks to define the only legitimate role for the ATCA in the
constitutional structure.151 If the ATCA is to be properly applied, the role
of the judge should first be to determine whether the case at hand is one
falling within a special jurisdictional category. If the case meets the
requirements of one of these categories, reference to international law will
be appropriate and was anticipated by the Framers in the crafting of Article
Ill. If, however, the case or controversy does not fall within one of these
categories, the judge must look to the Constitution, the laws of the United
States, or a treaty of the United States. The court must restrict itself to
referencing these domestic declarations of law. This means that the judge
must look to "laws of the United States." Under the structural view pro-
posed here, these laws cannot include a general international common law.
The judge's duty, therefore, is to ascertain whether Congress has defined
an offense against the law of nations, making it actionable under the
domestic law clause. If it has not, the judge has no authority to apply inter-
national law.
Such an approach respects the constitutional construction, but, to this
Author's knowledge, has never been discussed by a court interpreting judi-
cial cognizance over the "law of nations." Several examples will illustrate
the workability of this approach and its current disregard. For purposes of
this analysis, it shall be presumed that problems relating generally to the
justiciability of these issues in relation to the "political question" and "act
of state" doctrines are not a concern and that all other preliminary ques-
political branches might authorize the development of federal common law rules con-
cerning customary international law. Id. at 869. This Note, however, argues that Article
III cannot accomodate such a delegation, for neither Congress nor the Executive has the
power to expand the boundaries of the Constitution. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992); THE FEDaERAsr No. 78, supra note 3. Instead, common law rules
on the law of nations may only exist in the enumerated categories discussed in this
Note.
151. Some may argue that the issue of the ATCA's constitutionality is moot, given that
many of the cases brought under the statute may be brought into federal jurisdiction
under the diversity of citizenship provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Rules of statutory con-
struction, however, require that the ATCA, codified in Section 1350, be analyzed as a
separate provision with independent meaning. If it does not mean something more than
a suit between an alien (presumed a citizen for purposes of § 1331 diversity jurisdiction)
and a foreign state, citizen or subject, the provision is superfluous. Thus, Article III
diversity jurisdiction standing alone cannot save this statute from a challenge even if, as
applied, it will sometimes satisfy the diversity requirement. Furthermore, even under
diversity jurisdiction, the courts cannot ignore the province of Congress to define
offenses against the law of nations. The judiciary remains bound by separation of pow-
ers principles no matter how a case or controversy falls into its jurisdiction.
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tions of jurisdiction other than the law of nations are met.' 5 2
B. Test One: Taking Cognizance of the "Law of Nations" Will Be
Proper If Jurisdiction Obtains From One of Four Enumerated
Categories of Article III
As Part II illustrates, the Framers contemplated that some areas of special
jurisdiction would involve international law, either substantively or as pro-
cedural rules."53 By rejecting a general grant of authority over matters
affecting national peace and harmony and enumerating a particular set of
categories, the Framers indicated that international law would not be gen-
erally controlling under the Article III phrase, the "laws of the United
States." From ancient times, admiralty law involved a unique set of com-
mon law concerns which developed between states as part of the law of
nations. 154 Courts adjudicating cases affecting foreigners necessarily
needed to respect rules of diplomacy and the sovereignty of other nations.
Moreover, courts needed the power to make Americans accountable for
wrongs done to foreigners in order to avoid inciting a foreign nation to
impute responsibility for a citizen's action upon the United States and
retaliate in kind."' s These concerns, covered by enumerating the catego-
ries of special jurisdiction, were understood to be areas requiring an under-
standing and application of the law of nations.
Furthermore, as previously contended, this enumeration must be
interpreted as the entire area in which such an application was intended to
occur. If the Framers had understood the "laws of the United States" to
include generally all of international law, there would be no reason to men-
tion these special categories in Article III. Thus, in order to avoid an inter-
pretation that these special categories are surplusage, the "laws of the
United States" must be read as not including a general controlling interna-
tional law.
Because the Framers contemplated that the law of nations would be
cognizable when sitting in one of these special categories, it is appropriate
for the judiciary to use the ATCA as an enabling statute which triggers their
Article III/special category jurisdiction. Questions as to what the law of
nations entails, how it is to be discerned, and whether it is stagnant or
evolving will still be important, but their resolution is not necessary to this
proposition. The point is that whatever the true "law of nations" is, it can
only be considered when the judiciary has jurisdiction under one of these
special legal categories of Article III. To that extent, from a purely struc-
152. This Author, however, finds the application of these doctrines to the ATCA to be
generally persuasive and finds much merit in the concurring opinion of Judge Robb in
Tel-Oren. See generally Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823-27 (Robb, J., concurring).
153. Procedurally, international law is invoked in conflict of law questions.
154. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. See also Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A
Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HAsTINGs INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 445
(1995) (arguing that the ATCA was intended only to extend to the well-established torts
prohibited by the law of prize).
155. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 126, at 536 ("The union will undoubtedly be
answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members.").
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tural standpoint, one could even accept the principles for ascertaining the
law of nations discussed in Part I of this Note.
156
Each of those cases in the Smith-Paquete Habana line, later relied on in
the ATCA cases for the proposition that the law of nations is part of the law
of the United States, can be reconciled with this first test of jurisdictional
authority. Because each case involved a decision of admiralty, the courts
were correct to apply the law of nations. 157 Within these special catego-
ries, the law of nations was, in fact, federal common law. This federal com-
mon law, however, need not reach beyond these special categories.
Because the holdings in each of the ATCA cases discussed in Part I did not
rely on a special jurisdictional category of Article III, the precedents estab-
lishing that the law of nations is part of our law, from the Smith-Paquete
Habana line, are distinguishable and should not apply to the resolution of
the jurisdictional questions in ATCA cases. Both the text of the categories
and the original understanding of the purpose behind their creation sup-
ports such a conclusion.
The methods for finding and interpreting the law of nations estab-
lished by the cases in Part I, though suspect,158 need not be rejected to
accept this type of restriction. Whatever the law of nations may be and
whatever portion is applicable to the case at hand can be researched and
applied by a court sitting in a special jurisdictional category. It could be
accepted that the cognizable "law of nations" in the ATCA evolves, that
international law is, indeed, knowable, and that it can be ascertained, with-
out prejudice, by reference to works of commentators and jurists in the
field. Because the special categories permit application of international
law, one could accept these principles of interpretation and accept the
holdings and rationales in each of the cases discussed in Part I.A, while
also accepting this first proposed test for jurisdiction.
156. Applying originalism as a rule of statutory interpretation, however, would
require that the words be construed to mean what they meant at the time the statute was
passed. This would negate an "evolving" concept of international law. See SCALIA, supra
note 131, at 23-25. As mentioned, however, for purposes of this Note, a resolution of
what the "law of nations" truly means today is not critical. Though the meaning must be
discerned when operating in one of the special jurisdictional categories, its definition is
irrelevant to the proposition that such a meaning may only be employed when adjudicat-
ing a case in one of these special categories.
157. Most of these decisions (e.g., Smith, The Paquete Habana, The Neirede) were pre-
Erie, a period when the courts could ascertain a general "common law" as opposed to
being restricted to ascertaining "federal law." Thus, some also argue that the rules estab-
lishing the law of nations as part of our law should no longer control. Bradley & Gold-
smith, supra note 11, at 827-31, 849-60 (discussing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938)). Though much of Erie's language gives weight to the conclusion of this Note,
the following passage is of particular importance: "There is no federal general common
law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a
State whether they be local in their nature or 'genera'.. . And no clause in the Constitu-
tion purports to confer such power upon the federal courts." Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at
78.
158. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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C. Test Two: Taking Cognizance of the "Law of Nations" Will Be
Proper If Jurisdiction Obtains From An Action of Congress
Defining a "Law of Nations" Pursuant to Its Article I
Power
As James Madison articulated, "[N]o foreign law should be a standard far-
ther than is expressly adopted."1 59 If a court is not sitting within a special
jurisdictional category, it must rely on the "laws of the United States" as
the authority for applying international law. This category is much more
limited than the areas of special jurisdiction. This conclusion is premised
on two points. First, the enumeration of the special categories, as dis-
cussed earlier, means that no general grant to the courts over international
law exists in any circumstance. Second, because the Constitution grants to
Congress and not the courts the power to define offenses against the law of
nations, the courts are impotent in this area absent a congressional defini-
tion of an offense. If the law of nations exists as an overarching, independ-
ent, and controlling body of law, it would not be necessary for Congress to
define which parts of international law it thinks controlling and worthy of
the status of "laws of the United States."
Little discussion of Congress's Article I definitional power is seen in
the opinions of the jurists interpreting the ATCA. 160 In its brief in the
Ninth Circuit case of Trajano v. Marcos, the Bush Department of Justice
unsuccessfully advocated the position that a criminal1 61 offense against
the law of nations must be defined by Congress as a prerequisite to ATCA
jurisdiction. 162 This indicated a shift in policy, probably due to the change
in administrations, from the Department of Justice's position in Filartiga,
which supported the grant of jurisdiction based on sources other than
159. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVETION OF 1787, at 316 (Farrand ed., 1986).
160. For a discussion of the meaning of Congress's Article I power to define offenses
against the law of nations in a general context, see Charles D. Siegel, Deference and Its
Dangers: Congress' Power to 'Define... Offenses Against the Law of Nations,' 21 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 865 (1988) (arguing that Congress may not create offenses but may define
offenses having already risen to accepted international status, but shedding little addi-
tional insight into the meaning of the clause); Comment, The Offenses Clause: Congress'
International Penal Power, 8 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 279 (1969).
161. This Note leaves open the question of whether Congress's Article I, Section 8,
Clause 10 power is limited to defining only criminal offenses, and works on the pre-
sumption that civil offenses such as torts can also be defined under that clause. Even if
the Article I provision was to be limited to criminal offenses, the judiciary would still
have no jurisdictional authority. The fact that a general grant of jurisdiction over the
law of nations cannot exist within Article III of the Constitution remains unchanged.
See infra Part III.A. Moreover, because the case could only fall under the "laws of the
United States" category of Article III, it is unclear that the Department of Justice was
foreclosing an application of the "law of nations" to cases arising under one of the enu-
merated categories discussed in Part III.B of this Note. It simply would not have been
relevant for the Department to discuss that issue in its brief for this case.
162. See David Cole et al., Interpreting the Alien Tort Statute: Amicus Curiae Memoran-
dum of International Law Scholars and Practitioners in Trajano v. Marcos, 12 HAsINGS
INT'L & ComP. L. REv. 1, 3, 17 (1988) (criticizing the Memorandum for the U.S. as
Amicus Curiae submitted in Trajano (No. 86-2448)); Kim, supra note 106, at 402.
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domestic law.163 Relying on Filartiga, the Trajano court held that the
ATCA provided jurisdiction regardless of whether Congress had acted to
define official torture claims as violations of the "law of nations."' 64 In
light of the previous discussion, this seems clearly erroneous.
The Department of Justice's argument on the Article I power, however,
was incomplete and may have had more impact on the court had it
employed the two-test analysis adopted in this Note. The Department did
not couple its assertion that the offense must be defined by Congress with
a supporting analysis of the enumerated special jurisdictional categories,
the existence of which negates a general authority to ascertain the "law of
nations" under the "laws of the United States." However, when these argu-
ments are viewed together, the application of the law of nations fulfills a
logical role within the constitutional structure. This role maintains mean-
ing for the Article I power that the Department was attempting to defend.
An analogy to another constitutional grant of legislative power sup-
ports the limitation that courts must reference Congress's definitions of
offenses against the law of nations. The Constitution grants Congress the
power to regulate commerce between and among the States. Thus, the
courts do not retain a power to fashion common law rules to regulate com-
merce. 165 Just as the courts lack the power to define appropriate regula-
tions of commerce, they lack the authority to use the common law as a
means for defining offenses against the law of nations. 166 Such a construc-
tion respects and maintains Congress's exclusive power over this activity.
These conclusions partially arise from the fact that inherent in the
power to regulate or to define is the authority to choose not to regulate or
define. In other words, power need not always be exercised, and a pre-
sumption does not exist that everything should be regulated or defined.
When a court decides to look beyond Congress for controlling regulations
or for controlling definitions, it may be usurping Congress's power to
refrain from regulating or defining. 167 Stated another way, the court may
163. Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 500 (9th Cir. 1992); Kim, supra note 106, at
402.
164. Trajano, 978 F.2d at 500.
165. See Weisburd, supra note 122, at 1241-42. Weisburd specifically states that,
"[for example, the commerce power has never been used to justify a federal common
law of interstate commerce." Id. (citing M. REDIsH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN
THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 98-99 (1980)).
166. See id. at 1241. Weisburd states that, "[tihe Supreme Court has never held that a
grant of authority to the political branches to deal with a subject is enough to permit the
Court to frame common-law rules on that subject, even if the federal authority is exclu-
sive of the states." Id. (citations omitted).
167. See id. at 1268; Arthur M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and Interna-
tional Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 38-44 (1995). Weisburd argues:
Holding that the Executive is constrained by international law.., would shift
power from the elected President to the unelected courts... [and] could leave
the United States bound by policy choices in which no element of the American
government actively participated. This result could occur because the United
States can easily be held to be bound by a rule of customary international law to
which it did not object during the process of its formation, even if it did not
actively participate in advancing the rule.
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create a regulation or definition where Congress clearly wishes to refrain
from regulating commerce or refrain from creating a controlling rule of
law. Weisburd describes this type of outcome, discussing the effects that a
judicial pronouncement on the law of nations might have upon the Execu-
tive's discretion:
A judicial effort, not grounded in the Constitution to require a particular
legislative outcome amounts to depriving officials of discretion vested in
them by the Constitution. The effort itself thus would be unconstitutional.
Similarly, since the President acts as the primary American legislator in the
field of customary international law by determining the day-to-day practice
of the United States, judicial efforts to control that practice on nonconstitu-
tional grounds amount to interference with legislative discretion vested in
the President by the Constitution... [limiting] a discretion the Constitution
has left unlimited.
168
Because international law is so closely tied to (if not coterminous with) the
political questions of international relations, judicial decisions entrenching
principles into binding restrictions on sovereignty necessarily constrain
the latitude of the political branches. In fact, the cases involving the ATCA
provide empirical evidence of precisely this type of usurpation of the legis-
lative power to define offenses against the law of nations.
For example, using Filartiga and Kadic as illustrations, each court
looked to various international declarations and resolutions, including the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, to interprete the scope of the "law
of nations" under the ATCA. Such references create two problems. First,
many of the sources relied, or at least partially relied, upon to determine a
controlling rule of international law have never been ratified by Congress.
Worse yet, Congress considered these declarations and resolutions and
specifically chose not to accept them as binding authority. This poses seri-
ous questions about the legitimacy of their use as sources of law. Second,
these types of documents are normally drafted with an understanding that
they will not act as law, thereby making their language far less precise and
much broader than any signatory might normally wish to embody in a
statute.
Relying on proclamations of international assemblies creates
problems because the text of these documents are liberally drafted and
embody general goals or aspirations as opposed to legally binding princi-
ples.169 Filartiga, Kadic, and other cases applying the ATCA, however, have
Weisburd, supra note 122, at 1268 (citing Waldock, General Course on Public Interna-
tional Law, 106 REcUEIL DES COURS 1, 50 (1962)).
168. Weisburd, supra note 122, at 1255-56. See also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note
11, at 844-47 (arguing that declarations that the law of nations is part of the laws of the
United States might create executive obligations under the "Take Care" clause in Article
II of the Constitution and might also raise federalism concerns through obligations
placed on the states through the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the U.S.
Constitution).
169. One court in a case where plaintiffs sought jurisdiction under the ATCA, for
example, granted a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1) motion on the basis that the international
principles relied upon, the Stockholm Principles on the Human Environment,
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looked to such documents as supporting authority for their pronounce-
ments on the existence of an international law.1 70 In Filartiga, for
example,
[Tjhe Second Circuit alluded to certain international treaties on human
rights, including the American Convention on Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The first
two of these were among the four treaties on human rights submitted by
President Carter to the Senate for its advice and consent in 1978 [and the
United States was not involved in the third]. Neither in the court's opinion
nor in the amicus brief filed in the Filartiga case jointly by the Departments
of Justice and State, was reference made to the reservations, declarations,
understandings, and statements that President Carter recommended that
the Senate include in its resolution of advice and consent. The effect of
these qualifications of the two treaties would be to render them non-self-
executing for the United States, requiring implementing legislation to
become effective as law in the United States.
171
The Filartiga court did not even discuss or recognize either Congress's fail-
ure to ratify these documents or the affirmative and explicit concerns
voiced by both Congress and the President in relation to the content of
these documents. Yet it seems dear, especially in light of Congress's power
to define offenses against the law of nations, that these sentiments should
restrict the courts' reliance upon such documents as an authoritative state-
ment of the law.
172
Congress's actions on the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
do not set forth any specific proscriptions, but rather refer only in a general
sense to the responsibility of nations to insure that activities within their juris-
diction do not cause damage to the environment beyond their borders. Nor does
the Restatement of Foreign Relations law constitute a statement of universally
recognized principles of international law.
Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). This type of
approach recognizes the limited "legal" nature of international declarations, proclama-
tions, and the like.
170. The Filartiga court cited as authority a number of international treaties, "to
which the United States is not a party," to establish a universal norm against torture in
modern usage and practice. Sohn, supra note 53, at 308. See also Wilner, supra note 53,
at 319 (noting that Filartiga cited "multilateral treaties to which the U.S. [had] not
adhered, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.").
171. Rusk, supra note 53, at 315 (citations omitted). Hassan provides a similar
conclusion:
[T]he President also inserted various reservations, declarations and understat-
ings [sic], thereby further decreasing the efficacy of those treaties [including the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights], quo the USA, when eventually those treaties are ratified
by the USA
Hassan, supra note 41, at 255 (also adding that the Genocide Convention, submitted to
the Senate in 1948, has still not been ratified).
172. See Jacobsen, supra note 37, at 849 (arguing that, "[tihe Filartiga court should
have been sensitive to the Senate's deliberate inaction and refrained from creating a new
rule of international law .... [T]he court might have effectively curtailed the Senate's
ability to set policy in the area of human rights.").
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ical Rights, 173 the American Convention on Human Rights, or on the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights are not isolated situations. In fact,
Congress has failed to ratify the vast majority of human rights treaties
sponsored by the United Nations. 174 This record indicates a general
unwillingness on the part of the United States to recognize broad princi-
ples of human rights as controlling legal authority. 175 For the courts to
ignore this reality and insist that these documents form a foundation for
ascertaining the "law of nations" component of the ATCA is to harm Con-
gress in two ways. First, it ignores Congress's power to refrain from codify-
ing certain principles or norms into U.S. law. Second, it restricts
congressional power to legislate in a manner contrary to these principles or
norms. By proclaiming that this principle or norm is universal and bind-
ing upon all states (or, in the case of Kadic, all states and some individu-
als), the court is stating that an obligation Congress has been specifically
unwilling to accept will now bind the United States and its Congress.
17 6
Furthermore, even if one disregards Congress's refusal to accept these
declarations, the parties drafting the substance of these documents did not
intend for them to be construed as law.177 Had the drafters intended for
173. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights awaited Senate action
since 1978, id. at 847, eventually entering into force for the United States in late 1992
with five reservations, five understandings, four declarations, and one proviso. See gen-
erally John Quigley, Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of the United States
Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 HAuv. HUM. RTs.J.
59 (1993).
174. Jacobsen, supra note 37, at 847-48 ("[Tjhe Senate has been unwilling to extend
international law to encompass the protection of human rights.").
175. See id. at 849. Jacobsen states:
The Senate has refrained thus far from ratifying ... numerous ... human rights
treaties, thereby expressing an unwillingness to create any internationally recog-
nized legal protections for human rights. The Senate's primary concern has
been that the treaty provisions might intrude upon the sovereignty of nations
and of the United States in particular.
Id. See also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 869 (stating that, "[flar from author-
izing the application of the new CIL [customary international law] as domestic federal
law, the political branches have made clear that they do not want the new CIL to have domes-
tic law status.") (emphasis added).
176. For a good hypothetical analysis of the potential and diverse outcomes from the
use of international resolutions or covenants as evidence of the law of nations, see Pol-
lock, supra note 65, at 257-59. Pollock argues, however, that a construction of the ATCA
which makes it applicable only to "flagrant violations" of the law of nations would pre-
vent absurd results. Id.
177. "The simple fact is that this [Universal] Declaration [of Human Rights] was not
drafted or proclaimed to serve as law." Rusk, supra note 53, at 313 (quoting Eleanor
Roosevelt, Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, who stated when presenting
the Declaration to the U.N. General Assembly, that "[iut is not and does not purport to
be a statement of law or of legal obligation... [it is] a common standard of achievement
.... " (XIX Bulletin, DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 19, 1948, No. 494, at 751)). Rusk further
contends that this was the understanding of Congress, the Executive, and even the
United States delegates to the United Nations:
As one of the authors of the instruction that Mrs. Roosevelt received from her
government on this point, I can report that there was no question in Washington
or in New York that the Universal Declaration was not intended to operate as
law. There was no serious consultation with the appropriate committees or
Congress, as would have been essential had there been any expectation that law
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these documents to become legally binding in the courts, many of these
documents might not have passed out of the multinational body, might not
have been signed by the United States, and had they been accepted in some
form, would surely exhibit a dramatically different language and scope
than those promulgated with an understanding that the document was
merely aspirational. As Rusk has stated, "It should be noted.., that votes
cast [on UN General Assembly Resolutions] with the knowledge that the
result will not be law are very different from votes that would be cast if
there were a general awareness that the result would be operationally and
legally binding."178 In light of this reality, a court looking to these docu-
ments in an attempt to ascertain "law" is clearly acting improperly. It is
like looking to the core of an orange to determine the contents of the core
of an apple.
This conclusion, that universal declarations are not meant to act as
controlling law, is strengthened by an examination of the bodies creating
these documents. Realizing that the United Nations is to have no sovereign
authority, Dean Rusk articulates the nature of its "power" as understood by
member states:
The [UN] Charter... did not contemplate that the General Assembly would
be a legislative body in the field of international law generally.... There is
little doubt that a general legislative power vested in the General Assembly
would have prompted the Senate of the United States to refuse advice and
consent to the Charter. 17
9
Thus, even if Congress could delegate its power to define offenses against
the law of nations to this international body, it clearly did not intend to do
so. Similarly, other multinational organizations to which the United States
is a party lack a general legislative power. They may have the ability to
draft treaties, but even these do not become binding upon the United States
unless two-thirds of the Senate chooses to give its advice and consent to the
ratification of that treaty. 180 Moreover, even when Congress ratifies a
treaty, it may often require additional legislation to "execute" provisions of
the treaty.181
Not only should Congress maintain the ability to reject, or at least
refuse to accept, an international proclamation, it has already shown that it
is capable of specifically adopting a principle of international law, exercis-
ing its power to define the law of nations set forth in Article I. The TVPA
was coming into being. Indeed, Mrs. Roosevelt was given great leeway in her
part in the drafting of the Declaration partly because it was understood that law
was not being created.
Id. at 314.
178. Id. at 315.
179. Id. at 314.
180. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 2.
181. This is the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.
Even when Congress ratifies a treaty, convention, or other international document, a
non-self-executing treaty will not through ratification alone create any automatic, cogni-
zable cause of action for a breach of the agreement. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Repub-
lic, 726 F.2d 774, 808-19 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
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provides evidence of the competency of Congress to define offenses against
the law of nations.182 When the ATCA is viewed only as a jurisdictional
statute which provides a forum for causes of action created when Congress
acts under its power to define and punish an offense against the law of
nations, it can play a useful role in the constitutional structure. The Kadic
court, however, not sitting in one of the enumerated categories of special
jurisdiction, refused to look exclusively at the will of Congress and instead
looked beyond it, into the realm of international pronouncements on the
subject of torture. Moreover, that court failed to recognize the relevance of
congressional silence on the issue of non-state actors committing acts of
torture. The TVPA sanctions only those acting under color of law.
183 It
would at least be reasonable for the court to exercise restraint when Con-
gress has legislated partially in an area and chosen, although not necessar-
ily purposefully, not to legislate in the remainder of the area. The inclusion
of state actors in the TVPA indicates that Congress has considered the sub-
ject of torture and has not legislated on that subject in relation to private
actors. The absence of congressional action is often purposeful. Yet when
the judiciary chooses to look into the world of international principles to
fashion its own decision on international law, it risks creating a cause of
action Congress may specifically wish to leave unhatched.
Granting the judiciary a general power to ascertain the "law of
nations" not only creates a vague standard, it allows a tremendous amount
of judicial discretion to pick and choose from the multitude of interna-
tional "principles" floating around in the world - regardless of whether
they have been accepted or defined as law by Congress, yet effectively bind-
ing Congress all the same. A restriction on action or an obligation to act,
declared by the courts as applicable to all nations, must presumably bind
the United States as well.' 8 4 It is also a pronouncement of the U.S. posi-
tion on an issue in international law, often touching on international rela-
tions.185 Such a pronouncement could easily trigger foreign policy
problems.186 This was precisely the type of problem the Framers wished
182. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
183. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994).
184. One court has expressed this concern as follows: "Not all conduct which may
be harmful to the environment, and not all violations of environmental laws, constitute
violations of the law of nations.... Otherwise more detailed statutes and regulations
would be effectively superseded, contrary to the intention of the legislatures involved."
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 WL 142006, *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
185. The court in Aguinda also recognized this concern when stating: "[W]ere con-
duct to occur exclusively in a foreign country, caution would be necessary where [the
ATCA] is invoked, in order to assure that decisionmaking by other countries is not inter-
fered with by adjudication in the United States under necessarily highly general con-
cepts." Id.
186. Marshall points out that Filartiga never confronts this historical evidence despite
the fact that its approach "might often trigger the opposite effect of instigating such
conflict." Marshall, supra note 91, at 612-13. Judge Bork also expressed that,
[Flor a young weak nation, one anxious to avoid foreign entanglements and
embroilment in Europe's disputes, to undertake casually and without debate to
regulate the conduct of other nations and individuals abroad, conduct without
an effect upon the interests of the United States, would be a piece of breathtak-
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to avoid by leaving the mass of foreign relations to the political branches,
but allowing some suits, such as those necessary so as not to invoke a
foreign state's anger by denying one of its citizens or ambassadors a rem-
edy in a U.S. court for a wrong done upon him by a U.S. citizen.187
The existence of the congressional power to define offenses against the
"law of nations" therefore negates any presumption that the judiciary is
given a common law power to define or expand the obligations of persons
or states under the ATCA. Even if the courts could constitutionally obtain
jurisdiction over the general subject of torts in violation of international
law, it would be improper for the courts to do so and imprudent for Con-
gress to grant such broad authority beyond that already existing in the spe-
cial jurisdictional categories. If the judiciary looks to an "international
law," not so defined by Congress, the risk exists that the judiciary will
apply an international norm with which Congress disagrees, or to which it
has not given priority. As stated earlier, a judicial pronouncement of an
international law has the same effect as legislation, in that it is now pro-
nounced as a law of the United States, determined by judicial research into
conflicting international scholarship and documents - an endeavor ulti-
mately requiring a subjective choice. It requires value judgments. Not only
is such a pronouncement a legislative act, but because it is labeled as an
obligation or prohibition binding all persons, the judiciary has the power
to restrict the legal actions of Congress, once again encroaching upon its
power.
The TVPA, therefore, is evidence that Congress is capable of incorpo-
rating international laws into the laws of the United States without the
unsolicited assistance of the judiciary.' 8 8 Because Congress has ilus-
trated it can and will legislate in those areas of international law which it
deems important, it has also demonstrated its ability to remain silent on a
number of issues it wishes not to address or which it means specifically to
reject. If the judiciary uses congressional or executive silence on an issue
ing folly - so breathtaking as to render incredible any reading of the statute that
produces such results.
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 821 (Bork, J., concurring).
187. See Marshall, supra note 91, at 612 (discussing the importance of the real pur-
pose of the ATCA being "to allow aliens to bring suits in U.S. federal courts in order to
avoid a foreign conflict with the alien's home state"). See also Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782-
91 (Edwards, J., concurring) (essential use of ATCA is to quash potential foreign rela-
tions conflicts); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812-16, 821-22 (Bork, J., concurring) (same); Jay
M. Lewis Humphrey, Note, A Legal Lohengrin: Federal Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act of 1789, 14 U.S.F. L. REv. 107, 113 (arguing "it was precisely to avoid such
damage to foreign relations that the ATCA was enacted"); Smith, supra note 50, at 444
n.49 (contending "the drafters were therefore justifiably concerned that an alien's
unredressed claim might develop into an international confrontation."); Harvey, supra
note 64, at 343-44 (arguing that "the framers recognized that the world community
would hold the national government accountable for the actions of American citizens").
188. Statutes other than the TVPA also establish that Congress can and will legislate
when it wishes. See 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994) (Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat.
113, 113-14; criminalizing piracy as defined by the law of nations); Louis HiknN, FoR-
EIGN AFIAils AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 508 n.16 (2d ed. 1996) (citing addi-
tional statutes passed pursuant to the "define and punish" clause).
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as a trigger for its own search of extraterritorial legal principles, it risks
usurping the political branches' power to refrain purposefully from creat-
ing an international obligation or accepting an "international" rule.
Article III does not extend the judicial power to cases or controversies
arising generally under the law of nations, yet the ATCA, as applied in
Kadic and other cases, attempts to create such an authority. These cases
purport to find a general recognition of the "law of nations" as part of the
"laws of the United States.' 1 8 9 If this were true, however, it would make
additional enumerations of jurisdiction in Article III superfluous, violating
a principal canon for construing a written document. Furthermore, the
precedent on ascertaining the "law of nations" is not directly applicable to
cases arising under the "laws of the United States." The Neirade, Smith, and
The Paquete Habana, as admiralty cases, all fall within the enumerated cate-
gories of Article III and were not decided under the "laws of the United
States" clause. To that extent, the rules for construing international law
developed in those cases may not apply to the various cases acquiring juris-
diction through the latter category. 190 Because those courts were sitting in
admiralty, they were required to apply international law. 19 1 But, the
rationale of those cases does not necessarily inform interpretations of the
"laws of the United States," for a court "may label a subject 'part of our law'
without intending to suggest that it falls within the 'laws of the United
States."
' 192
Application of the two category structural framework proposed here
facilitates the process of determining whether a cause of action exists in a
particular case. Filartiga does not fall within one of the enumerated cate-
gories of Article III, and it was neither alleged nor found that Congress had
defined the acts in question as an offense against the law of nations. Thus,
the court should not have exercised jurisdiction in that case. Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic would endure a similar fate. Though the holding
would be the same, the rationale could be based completely on the case's
failure to meet the requirements of the enumerated categories or to fall
under the laws as enacted by Congress. Similarly, the Kadic court could
follow this method of analysis to reach a much cleaner and more legitimate
189. For an excellent and comprehensive argument as to why the "law of nations" is
not part of the "laws of the United States," see Weisburd, supra note 122. While his
arguments are quite persuasive in support of this conclusion, Weisburd's focus is not on
defending or examining the structural arguments advanced in this Note. For an excel-
lent discussion of why modern customary international law, including "human rights
norms," should not be considered part of domestic law by the courts, see Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 11. As stated earlier, those authors do not discuss the structural
arguments advanced in this Note nor do they present any framework for applying the
ATCA.
190. See Weisburd, supra note 122, at 1237 (discussing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938); stating that "the force of a common-law rule depends on the author-
ity of the court that adopted it.... [11f an institution is competent to promulgate rules
only in certain circumstances, then those rules necessarily apply only in those
circumstances.").
191. Id. at 1228.
192. Id. at 1229.
Vol. 31
1998 Constitutional Limits on the "Law of Nations"
outcome, albeit opposite to the holding the court ultimately reached. First,
jurisdiction could not be obtained under the admiralty, counsels, or for-
eign diversity grants. Second, the only apparent Congressional declaration
on the matter, the TVPA, only provides a remedy for torture and only when
committed under color of law. Unless one is willing to consider Karadzic a
head of state,193 the statute appears not to apply. Thus, under the struc-
tural analysis, no jurisdiction exists for the courts to hear this claim. A
similar analysis can be followed in all other cases requiring an application
of the ATCA.
Conclusion
In 1788, the constitutional convention in New York attempted to guard
against the danger of the judiciary's expansion of its jurisdiction by pro-
posing an amendment stating, "that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
of the United States, or of any other Court instituted by the Congress,
ought not, in any case, to be increased, enlarged or extended, by any fic-
tion, collusion, or mere suggestion."'194 A similar proposal was offered by
delegates at the Maryland convention. 195 Precisely such an extension of
judicial authority, by mere suggestion of the ATCA, is currently occurring
through the courts' application of the amorphous and varied concepts of
international "law."' 96
Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit has stated that the ATCA, "cries out
for clarification by the Supreme Court."'197 A clarification of the legitimate
193. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244-45 (2d. Cir. 1995) (leaving open the ques-
tion whether Karadzic was a head of state).
194. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 409 (1859).
195. Id. at 550.
196. The varied nature of international principles from which a judge might find
"law" raises another concern not covered in this Note - the ability of a judge to reach
any outcome due to the plethora of sources with varying degrees of legitimacy (or, per-
haps more properly, illegitimacy) that might justify the result he wishes to obtain. The
risk that a judge will abandon a judicial role for that of the legislative is heightened by
the mass of potential sources from which he might find "authority," the large number of
commentators willing to profess that some principle is "law" (via The Paquete Habana),
and the fact that international documents portending to be law are ever-growing. To
borrow from Judge Harold Levanthal, the use of international sources in judicial deci-
sion-making might be described as "the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party
and looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends." See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507
U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Levanthal on the subjective pro-
cess of using legislative history in statutory interpretation).
197. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards,
J., concurring). Because the precedents expansively employing the ATCA are fairly new
and because the Supreme Court has never spoken on the subject of the ATCA's scope, it
is not, nor could it ever be, too late to correct the constitutionally infirm application of
the ATCA. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said in arguing for restricting the use of fed-
eral common law before Erie, that the fact that the federal courts can ascertain "general
law" under the Swift v. Tyson doctrine is a "fallacy [that] has resulted in an unconstitu-
tional assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no lapse of time or
respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct." Black & White Taxi-
cab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-33 (1928) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). The same conclusion should be drawn in relation to the ATCA, a doctrine with
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constitutional role of the ATCA is becoming increasingly important as
internationalism increases. The number of international and intergovern-
mental organizations, and the consequent number of pronouncements,
declarations and the like from such groups, is continuously expanding.
The increasing number of international and multinational tribunals, such
as those related to the World Trade Organization and North American Free
Trade Agreement, also adds to the body of extraterritorial "judicial" pro-
nouncements on the law of nations. 198 As a result, the ATCA's reach, if left
unchecked, will continue to grow dramatically.
Though a limit on the ATCA's scope and the courts' use of interna-
tional law can, as this Note has argued, be justified solely by a proper read-
ing of constitutional powers, the strength of international law itself can be
increased through the exercise of judicial restraint. Employing interna-
tional law is most effective when done with a careful and reasoned
approach, conservatively enough so that each application retains a signifi-
cance of its own. In this sense, it is important for the U.S. government as a
whole to exercise discretion when it chooses which norms it will accord
"legal" status. The key aspects of international law become diffuse and
lose legitimacy when the body of law becomes so diverse that any sense of
a boundary disappears. Furthermore, the ability of the United States to
take the lead when it wants to promote a norm in the international commu-
nity diminishes. First, in order to be heard, the U.S. government must have
an identifiable voice on international affairs. Additionally, even that identi-
fiable voice must use discretion in choosing when to speak. The occasional
deliberate statement by the U.S. government on an issue concerning inter-
national principles will be noticed, remembered, and influential. However,
if the statements of the U.S. government become too regular because of
judicial opinions on the law of nations from a multitude of courts, then
those statements lose significance and become mere chatter.19 9
a similar problem of common law making authority. Cf. Alien Tort Claims Act and Tor-
ture Victim Protection Act: Brief of Amici Curiae in the United States Supreme Court in
Karadzic v. Kadic, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 683 (1997); Brief of Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 686 (1997) (publishing the
brief submitted by Erwin Chemerinsky, William W. Van Alstyne, and others arguing
that the Supreme Court should not review the Kadic opinion because the ATCA has been
applied by the federal courts "in a rigorous manner that has yielded generally consistent
results," because the "cases under the ATCA have [not] disturbed the overall fabric of
federal jurisdiction," and because essentially, the presence of the TVPA in the case made
it less suitable for the Supreme Court's first construction of the ATCA).
198. For a discussion of the emerging presence of pronouncements from interna-
tional tribunals and their effect in U.S. courts, including an opening essay by U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor on this subject, see gnerally Symposium,
The Interaction Between National Courts and International Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. Ir'L L.
& PoL. 1-483 (1996).
199. Writing on the importance of Congress exercising care before defining a "law of
nations" under Article I, Siegel provides an analogous precaution:
When Congress determines that a certain set of actions constitutes an offense
against the law of nations, it is doing more than establishing a domestic crime.
It is putting its imprimatur on certain international practice and saying that that
practice has reached a level at which it is binding upon nations. Congress has
every reason to be especially careful before reaching such a conclusion. Obvi-
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With an increasing acceptance of the Filartiga rationale and with its
expansive nature as evidenced by Kadic, there is no time to-waste in reining
in the doctrine of ATCA jurisdiction. This Note has argued that courts
applying the ATCA must only apply the "law of nations" in a manner con-
sistent with the text and structure of the Constitution. Article III enumer-
ates specific areas of law in which the law of nations plays an integral role,
and Article I grants Congress the power to define offenses against the "law
of nations." The judiciary must exercise caution to ensure that it stays
within the constitutional bounds of its power and refrains from infringing
the power of other branches.
ously, if Congress bestows legal status on rules that lack the requisites of a
norm - practice and opiniojuris - international law suffers. It is hard enough
to convince people the reality of international law without debasing it by giving
a false status to some 'rules.'... Determining the norms of customary interna-
tional law is a complex and often indeterminate enterprise. Congress must exer-
cise its best judgment in making that determination.
Siegel, supra note 160, at 962-63. Given the careful judgment that is required, even by
Congress, in defining international law, and given the ramifications of such a determi-
nation, it seems clear that such determinations should not normally be made by various
judges, incapable of speaking in one voice and not meant to make such politically-laden
judgments.

